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TAXATION
OVERVIEW

This article discusses eight recent decisions by the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, many of which required extensive statutory construction. After addressing three commercial cases, this survey considers two
estate and trust administration cases. This article then discusses a case
in which the timing of a minister's opposition to social security taxes
prevented him from qualifying for an exemption from social security
taxes. The survey concludes by considering two railway property tax
cases in which the Tenth Circuit construed section 306 of the Internal
Revenue Code.
I.
A.

COMMERCIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS

Unreasonable Rental Expenses under Section 162

In Harmon City, Inc. v. United States,' the Tenth Circuit considered
the deduction of rental expenses incurred by a closely-held corporation
in the absence of arm's length dealing. Harmon City, Inc. (taxpayer)
operated several retail supermarkets throughout Utah including a market in Granger, Utah. In 1973, Harmon City, Inc. sold the Granger store
to Harmon City Associates, a limited partnership whose partners consisted largely of Harmon City shareholders. The partnership leased
back the Granger store to the corporation for rental payments which
consisted of a base rate rental payment and a percentage override. The
percentage override was added to the leasing agreement after the parties discovered that the base rate rental would be insufficient to service
the mortgage commitment on the property.
In an opinion by Judge Saffels, 2 the Tenth Circuit upheld the IRS
determination that a portion of the taxpayer's rental expenses were not
reasonable and therefore not ordinary and necessary expenses deductible under IRC section 162(a)(3). After stating the general rule that it is
ordinarily inappropriate for the Commissioner to inquire into the reasonableness of rental payments, Judge Saffels went on to espouse the
exception to this rule, that the Commissioner should not defer where
there is a close relationship between lessor and lessee.3 In such a case,
the Commissioner may inquire into the reasonableness of the rental
1. 733 F.2d 1381 (10th Cir. 1984).
2. United States District Judge Saffels sitting by designation.
3. 733 F.2d 1381, 1383 (10th Cir. 1984); see also Safway Steel Scaffolds Co. v. United
States, 590 F.2d 1360, 1362 (5th Cir. 1979). "It is ordinarily inappropriate to inquire into
the reasonableness of the rent paid, however, this case presents an exception to the general rule. That exception is the case of a close relationship between the lessor and the
lessee." Id. at 1362; Brown Printing Co. v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1958);
Place v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 199 (1951), aFfd, 199 F.2d 373 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 927 (1953).
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amount paid to determine whether this amount exceeds the amount
which the lessee would have been required to pay had he dealt with a
4
stranger at arm's length.
Judge Saffels stated that the reasonableness issue is a question of
fact, and that the findings of the trial court will not be disturbed unless
found to be clearly erroneous. 5 Based on the testimony of the government's expert witness, as to the fair rental value of the lease, 6 Judge
Saffels upheld the trial court's determination that taxpayer's superior
management capabilities and the strength of its weekly sales averages
placed the taxpayer in an advantageous negotiating position. Such a position would have resulted in a fair rental value below the agreed upon
rentals if the lease had been negotiated at arm's length. 7 Moreover,
Judge Saffels noted that the record demonstrated that the lease was not
intended to reflect a reasonable rental value but merely to provide funds
8
necessary to service the mortgage liability on the property.
Harmon City places the Tenth Circuit outside the mainstream of circuits that have reviewed the reasonableness of rental expenses. In Southeastern Canteen Co. v. Commissioner,9 the Sixth Circuit, on facts very similar
to those in Harmon City, examined the personal objectives of both the
lessor and the lessee in structuring their agreements and upheld the
finding that the sale-leaseback agreements were not ends in themselves
but merely steps in an overall plan.' 0 Thus, in the Sixth Circuit's view,
the Commissioner's inquiry should focus upon not only the instant
transaction but also upon the entire history of the related parties' interactions. Likewise, the Seventh Circuit in Safway Steel Scaffolds Co. v. United
States upheld inquiry into the reasonableness of all transactions made
between the related parties.'I Harmon City more correctly focuses the
inquiry upon the reasonableness of the leasing transaction rather than
upon the reasonableness by which related parties structure their affairs.
B.

Federal Withholding, FICA, FUTA: Employee or Independent Contractor?
An employer is generally responsible for withholding federal taxes

4. Place v. Commissioner, 17 TC. 199, 203 (1951), ard, 199 F.2d 273 (6th Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 927 (1953).
5. 733 F.2d at 1385 (citing Monfort of Colorado, Inc. v. United States, 561 F.2d 190

(10th Cir. 1977)). This power given to the Commissioner is derived from the broader
declaration that the substance of a transaction rather than the form is controlling. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Southeastern Canteen Co. v. Commissioner, 410
F.2d 615, 619 n.6 (6th Cir. 1969); Smith v. Commissioner, 370 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1966).
6. The government's expert gave two methods for determining fair rental value:
(1) by examining leases for similar properties, but between unrelated parties, or (2) by
calculating the amount which constitutes a reasonable rate of return on the owner's investment in the property at the date of the lease's inception. 733 F.2d at 1383.

7. Harmon City's weekly sales averages in 1973 outperformed the national average
per square foot by more than two to one. The sales averages outperformed local supermarkets. 733 F.2d at 1385.
8. Id. at 1384.
9. 410 F.2d 615 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 833 (1969).
10. Id. at 620.
11. 590 F.2d 1360, 1362 (7th Cir. 1979).
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and for making FICA and FUTA contributions once the employer-em12
ployee relationship has been established. In Marvel v. United States,
(Marvel II) the Tenth Circuit reviewed the factors to be considered in
determining an individual's employment status.
In Marvel II, the taxpayers operated a photography business employing the services of thirty-one individuals, some of whom worked at
the taxpayer's studio and others who worked primarily out of their
homes. Taxpayers treated all of these individuals as independent contractors and accordingly did not withhold or pay federal employment
taxes.' 3 Upon the district court's judgment that certain individuals were
14
employees, the taxpayers sought Tenth Circuit review.
Under the Internal Revenue Code, common-law distinctions between an employee and an independent contractor determine a person's
status for federal employment tax purposes. 15 For this reason, Judge
Holloway recognized that the employee status exists when the person
for whom the services are performed has the right to direct and control:
(1) the method and manner in which the work is done, and (2) the result
sought to be achieved.1 6 By contrast, an independent contractor status
exists "when an individual performs services for another according to
his own method and manner, free from the direction and control of the
17
employer, in all matters, except as to the product of his work."'
12. 719 F.2d 1507 (10th Cir. 1983).
13. Id. at 1510.
14. The taxpayers raised other attacks on the district court opinion including: (1) that
the adjudicatory procedure whereby this cause was referred to a United States Magistrate
was statutorily and constitutionally infirm, (2) that assessment notices delivered to the taxpayers in the name of Marvel Photo were defective in that they failed to fulfill due process
requirements, and (3) that the penalties imposed on them were punitive and inappropriate
in light of the honest controversy over tax liability. On the first issue, Judge Holloway held
the 1976 amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 94-577, § 1, 90 Stat.
2729 codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(2) (1982) provided the statutory authorization for a consensual reference during the period in question. See Marvel 11, 719 F.2d at
1511. He also found the reference constitutionally permissible under Article III in reliance upon the district court's de novo review of the magistrate's determination. Id. at
1513. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980); see also Northern Pipeline Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 78-79 (1982) (plurality opinion). The taxpayer's reliance on Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1978), was held to be misguided in that the final judgment appealed from was the final decision of a United States
district court rather than a district appeal from magistrate determination.

719 F.2d at

1513.
On the procedural due process issue, Judge Holloway concluded the assessments
were valid and effective in that they listed the correct taxpayer identification number and
were issued in the trade name which the taxpayers had adopted. Id. at 1513. On the
appropriateness of penalties imposed issue, Judge Holloway refused to uphold the taxpayer's position since the issue was not properly before the court. Id. at 1516.
15. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3121(d), 3306(i), 3401(c) (1982). See also Employment Tax Regula3
tions 26 C.F.R. §§ 31.3121(d)-I, 31.3306(i)-I, 31. 401(c)-1 (1984).
16. 719 F.2d at 1514.
17. Id. Judge Holloway also listed other factors which could shed light on the distinction. "Other factors . . . include: (1) the substantiality of the investment of the person
rendering the service with his own tools and equipment, (2) the cost incurred by the alleged employee in rendering the service, as by the employment of his own laborers, (3) the
ability of the person rendering the service to profit from his own 'management skill',
(4) whether or not the service involved requires a special skill, (5) the permanency of the
relationship between the parties, and (6) whether the person rendering the service works
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Applying this standard, Judge Holloway found the tasks performed
at the studio dispositive of the employee-independent contractor issue.
In so finding, he referred to the testimony that the delivery boys assisted
in drying pictures daily at the studio. 18 He also referred to the work of
the oil colorist packaging proofs and cutting strips of film at the studio. 19 Similarly, Judge Holloway enumerated the duties the other employees performed in the studio. The only evidence relied on by the
court which did not demonstrate control was the testimony of some of
'20
the workers that the Marvels would "take care of their taxes."
Thus, the Tenth Circuit views the performance of tasks at an employer's place of business as largely dispositive of the employee-independent contractor issue. The court's rationale is based upon its
assumption that an employer's right to control at the place of business is
greater than its right to control elsewhere.
The Tenth Circuit's view, however, denigrates the "total situation"
standard set forth by the Supreme Court in United States v. Silk. 2 1 In Silk,
the Court stated "[t]he Social Security Agency and the courts will find
that degrees of control, opportunities for profit or loss, investment in
facilities, permanency of relation and skill required in the claimed independent operation are important for decision. No one is controlling
nor is the list complete."'2 2 Marvel is misleading to the extent that it
implies that the right to direct and control is dispositive. Silk directs that
all of the above factors should be examined and that no one factor is
23
controlling.
C.

Assumption Reinsurance Transactions and Accounting for Loading:
Security Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. United States

In Security Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. United States, 2 4 the Tenth Circuit
construed complex portions of the Internal Revenue Code concerning
life insurance companies. 2 5 Security Benefit resolved two issues under the
Phase II tax of the Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959.26
The first issue concerned whether life insurance companies must report
as compensation an amount equal to the reserve they are required to
establish in an assumption reinsurance transaction. The second issue
was whether life insurance companies must employ the same accounting
method in computing the inclusion in income of the net valuation porin the course of the recipient's business rather than in an ancillary capacity." Id. at n. 1
(citing Avis Rent A Car Sys. v. United States, 503 F.2d 423, 429 (2d Cir. 1974)).
18. 719 F.2d at 1515.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 331 U.S. 704, 719 (1947).
22. Id. at 716 (emphasis added).
23. Id.
24. 726 F.2d 1491 (10th Cir. 1984).
25. The Tenth Circuit has previously addressed the tax treatment of unpaid insurance
premiums in Commissioner v. Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 525 F.2d 786 (10th Cir.
1975), rev'd, 433 U.S. 148 (1977).
26. 26 U.S.C. §§ 801-820 (1982).
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tion of deferred and uncollected premiums as when computing the net
valuation portion of the gross premium added to the insurance company's reserves.
1. Background
In an effort to augment federal tax revenues realized from the operation of domestic insurance companies, Congress enacted the Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959.27 The special treatment
prescribed by the Act was designed to require a clearer reflection of insurance company income. 28 Among other issues, the Act sets forth the
tax implications of reinsurance transactions and the tax treatment of deferred and uncollected premiums.
In an assumption reinsurance transaction, one company transfers
policies to another company, the "reinsurer," which receives the insurance premiums, maintains the requisite statutory reserves, 29 and pays
the death benefits. 30 In such a transaction, the company assigning the
policies, "the reinsured," can reduce its required reserves, but must increase its income by the amount of such reduction. 3 ' By contrast, the
reinsurer must increase its required reserves, but may take a current de32
duction from income for the increase in reserves.
33
The Fifth Circuit in Mutual Savings Life Insurance Co. v. United States
was faced with determining the tax consequences of a reinsurance transaction. As a result of its assumption of policies of another company,
Mutual Savings was required to increase its insurance reserves by
$1,047,142.3 4 For its assumption of these policies, Mutual Savings received only $682,990 in tangible assets.3 5 Thus, the company gained a
deduction of over $1,000,000 and was required to include only
$682,990 in income. The government sought to impute an additional
amount of income so that the recognizable income would equal the allowable deduction.
Section 809(c)(1) provides for the inclusion in income of considera27. Id. For a discussion of this Act, see Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co., 57 T.C. 482, 498
(1972). See also Kaufman, Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959-An Appraisal of the

Effects on the Life Insurance Industry, (pts. I & 2) 16 NAT'L TAxJ. 337 (1963).
28. Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co., 57 T.C. 482, 498 (1972).
29.

State law prescribes the amount of the premium which must be added to insur-

ance reserves to provide for future death benefits. This amount, referred to as the "net
valuation premium," is determined under mortality and interest assumptions. Commissioner v. Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 433 U.S. 148 (1977).
30.

Mutual Say. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 488 F.2d 1142, 1144 (5th Cir. 1974).

31. Id.
32. 26 U.S.C. § 809(a)(1) (1982). For a discussion of the statutory scheme of subchapter L and its policy implications see Commissioner v. Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co.,
433 U.S. 148, 152-54 (1977). "Throughout the history of the federal income tax, Congress has taken the view that life insurance companies should not be taxed on the amounts
collected for the purpose of paying death benefits." Id. at 152. This policy is effectuated
by the allowance of current deductions for the required contributions to policy "reserves."
33. 488 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882 (1974).
34. Id. at 1145.
35.

Id.

316
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tion received in respect of the assumption of insurance liabilities. 3 6 Section 809(d)(2) provides for the deduction from income of the net
increase in reserves. 37 In 1962 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued a regulation which attempted to clarify the meaning of consideration received in reinsurance transactions.3 8 In Example 1 of this
regulation the reinsurer was not required to impute an additional
39
amount of income up to the deduction for increased reserves.
Pursuant to this regulation, the Fifth Circuit in Mutual Savings held
that the reinsurer was required to include in income only tangible assets
received. 40 In response to this decision, the IRS amended the 1962 regulation and formulated new rules for determining the consideration received in the sale of insurance policies. 4 1 The 1976 amendments
provide that where the reinsurer receives a net amount less than the
increase in the required reserves, the reinsurer shall be treated as having
received consideration equal to the increase in reserves. 4 2
2.

Reinsurance Transactions

In Security Benefit Lif, 43 the Tenth Circuit was faced with a reinsurance transaction indistinguishable from the transaction in Mutual Savings. Security Benefit assumed the life insurance policies of another
insurer. In recognition of this assumption, Security Benefit reported
over $5,900,000 as income. 44 This "consideration received" represented the fair market value of the cash, real estate, and securities received by Security Benefit. The company also deducted over $7,500,000
as the required increase in reserves attributed to the assumption of
45
these policies.
In district court, the government contended that the difference between the reported income and the allowable deduction represented additional income which must be imputed to the taxpayer. 4 6 The issue was
whether the 1976 amendments covered the transactions and, therefore,
whether the amendments would require the imputation as income of an
additional amount. 4 7 The district court held for the taxpayer, reasoning
that the additional imputation has no application outside the scope of a
"netting transaction." '4 8
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the government again pressed its
36. 26 U.S.C. § 809(c)(1) (1982).

37.
38.
39.
40.

26 U.S.C. § 809(d)(2) (1982).
Treas. Reg. § 1.817-4 (1962).
Treas. Reg. § 1.817-4(d)(3) (1962).
488 F.2d at 1145.

41. 40 Fed. Reg. 34128 (1975).
42. Treas. Reg. § 1.817-4(d)(2)(ii) (1976).
43. 726 F.2d 1491 (10th Cir. 1984).
44. Id. at 1493.
45. Id. The reserve was calculated by arriving at the present value of future benefits of
these policies.
46. 517 F. Supp. 740 (D. Kan. 1980).
47. Id. at 761. DistrictJudge Rogers adopted the taxpayer's labeling of double imputation as arbitrary and mechanical. Id. at 762.
48. Id. A netting transaction occurs when either the reinsurer or the reinsured pays a
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position that the difference between the two figures should be imputed
as additional income. 49 The government argued that the transaction was
covered by the 1976 amendments. The Tenth Circuit denied the additional imputation of income and held that a company is required to report as income only the fair market value of the tangible assets
received. 50 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion
that the transaction was not covered by the 1976 amendments but the
court did not go so far as to state that the application of the 1976
amendments should be restricted to netting transactions. 51 The thrust
of the court's opinion was that the discrepancy between income and deduction was created by the use of an unrealistically low interest rate for
determining the reserves. Thus, remedy should lie with a change of the
interest rate and not with an imputation of income.
During consideration of the Life Insurance Company Tax Act of
1959, the Senate Committee on Finance expressed concern over the
ability of insurance companies to reduce their tax burdens by manipulating the statutory interest rate which establishes the reserves. 5 2 The Senate Committee specifically expressed its concern with the ability to take
larger deductions, by a large addition to the reserve account, while limit53
ing the income included under Phase I of the Act.
The IRS attempt to balance the allowed deduction with the income
realized comports with the plain language of the statute and its legislative history. Thus, the Treasury Regulation, as amended, should have
been applied on the basis of its implementation of the congressional
54
intent.
Notwithstanding the Tenth Circuit's narrow construction of the
1976 amendments, the application of this regulation should not be denied to transactions which generate a deduction greater than the recognized income. Clearly in such circumstances the reinsurer is willing to
accept a smaller package of assets when that package is accompanied by
net amount to the other instead of both companies exchanging payments. 726 F.2d at
1494 n.1.
49. 726 F.2d at 1493.
50. Id. at 1495.
51. Id. at 1494.
52. S. REP. No. 291, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1575 (1959).

53.

S. REP. No. 291, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 14-17, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG.

& AD. NEWS !575, 1589-91 (1959).

54. The Commissioner promulgated the amendments to Treas. Reg. § 1.817 under
his authority to "prescribe all needful rules and regulations." 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (1982).
The courts have recognized a lower standard of deference when regulations are issued
under this general authorization. Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981).
In contrast, regulations issued under a specific grant of authority are given greater deference: "When the Commissioner acts under specific authority, our primary inquiry is
whether the interpretation or method is within the delegation of authority." Id. An even
higher degree of deference is provided for legislative regulations, i.e., those regulations
promulgated by an administrative agency using these regulations to fill gaps either explicitly or implicitly left by Congress. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974). Legislative
regulations are given controlling weight provided they are neither arbitrary, capricious,
nor manifestly contrary to the statute. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense
Council, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2782 (1984).
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a sizable tax deduction. The 1962 regulation, as amended, should be
interpreted as providing that when the reinsurer receives a net amount
equal to the value of the assets paid, less the tax benefits, the reinsurer
will recognize consideration equal to the increase in the required
55

reserves.

Courts should not restrict this regulation to those transactions
where the consideration received is expressly reduced by credits owed
to the exchanging party. The regulation, as amended, should have
equal validity where the consideration received is implicitly offset by tax
savings.
3.

Tax Treatment of Deferred and Uncollected Premiums

Apart from the tax treatment of reinsurance transactions discussed
above, the Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959 sought to
clarify the tax implications of deferred and uncollected premiums. The
Act, as codified in section 809 of the Internal Revenue Code, provides
that premium income must be included in the insurance company's taxa56
ble income.
To understand how deferred and uncollected premiums are included in taxable income, it is necessary to explain the various components of insurance premiums. Gross premiums received by the
company consist of a "net valuation premium" portion and a "loading"
portion. The "net valuation premium" is the portion of the premium
that will enable the company, given mortality and interest rate projections, to pay the death benefits to the policyholder. 57 "Loading" is the
'5
excess of the gross premium over the "net valuation premium."

8

Faced with the question of what portion of unpaid premiums should
be included in gross premium income, and accordingly, what portion
should be added to the company's reserves, the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Standard Life & Accident Insurance Co. 59 held that only the net
valuation premium portion need be included in taxable income. The
StandardLife Court sought to avoid the uncertainty and confusion inherent in segregating unpaid loading into deductible and nondeductible
parts and opted for a "practical rule which should minimize the likeli60
hood of future disputes."
Following Standard Life, Judge Logan held in Security Benefit that insurance companies need not employ the same accounting method used
to compute the net valuation portion of unpaid premiums as they use to
compute the net valuation portion of such premiums added to reserves.
Adopting the district court's reasoning that "the factors that determine
55. Treas. Reg. § 1.817-4(d) (1976).
56. 26 U.S.C. § 809(c)(1) (1982).
57. Security Benefit Life, 726 F.2d at 1496. State statutes require reserves equal to the
"net valuation premium" to ensure that death benefit funds are maintained.
58. Id. Loading is comprised of the company's expenses and profits. See also
Commissioner v. Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 433 U.S. 148, 150 (1977).

59. 433 U.S. 148 (1977).
60. Id. at 162.
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the amount of the increase in reserves are not the same as the factors
that determine the amount of loading on unpaid premiums," 6 1 Security
Benefit extended the reasoning in Standard Life to hold that perfect symmetry between the increase in reserves and the amount of loading in62
cludable in taxable income is not required.
The method of accounting used by Security Benefit to increase its
reserve deduction was a method approved by the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). 63 Judge Logan emphasized, as
did the Supreme Court in Standard Life, that section 818(a) provides for
rejection of the NAIC approach only if that approach is found to be inconsistent with the dictates of accrual accounting. 64
II.

FEDERAL TAx IMPLICATIONS OF ESTATE AND TRUST ADMINISTRATION

A.

Federal-State Comity

The bar and the courts have long been burdened by the problem of
is
deciding what effect should be given to a state trial court decree which 66
65
In Estate of Selby v. United States,
determinative of federal estate taxes.
the Tenth Circuit faced this difficult issue. Selby originated in a Colorado
probate court. The Colorado court permitted a personal representative's successor to renounce all rights and interests in property passed to
67
the decedent by the rules of survivorship by reopening a closed estate.
The sole purpose of the renunciation was to reduce the estate's federal
tax liability.
When the IRS refused the estate's claim for a refund, the estate
brought a refund suit in federal district court. The district court, in an
effort to maintain "proper federal-state comity," deferred to the state
probate court's interpretation of Colorado law and upheld the
68
renunciation.
On appeal, Judge Barrett recognized the broad federal power to
review state court decisions affecting federal tax liability. Noting several
factors set forth in Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 69 Judge Barrett's review
61. 517 F. Supp. 740, 770 (D. Kan. 1980).
62. 726 F.2d at 1498 (emphasis added). Standard Life does require symmetry regarding the net valuation portion of deferred and uncollected premiums includable under
§ 809(c)(1) and deductible under § 809(d)(2). Standard Life implied, and Security Benefit
held, that symmetry is not required between the taxable and deductible portions of
loading.
63. See Rev. Proc. 78-6, 1978-1 C.B. 588 (allowing companies that had adhered to the
treasury regulation prior to Standard Life to elect to change retroactively their method of
accounting).
64. 726 F.2d at 1498. See also Standard Life, 433 U.S. at 162-63.
65. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 462 (1967).
66. 726 F.2d 643 (10th Cir. 1984).
67. Id. at 646.
68. Id. at 645 (discussion of the district court decision).
69. 387 U.S. 456, 463-64 (1966). The Court listed the following factors: (1) whether
the Tax Commissioner was made a party to the state proceedings, (2) whether the state
proceedings were brought for the purpose of directly affecting federal estate tax liability,
(3) whether the legislative history of the marital deduction indicated that state court determinations be "final," and (4) whether the state determination was made by the highest
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of the state court determination revealed that the probate court proceeding was ex parte in nature, instituted solely to reduce federal tax liability, and concerned, at least in part, with the application of the marital
deduction. 70 Most important, Judge Barrett found that the probate
court's determination did not express the law of the state as envisioned
by Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins 71 because it was the decision of a probate
court rather than the Colorado Supreme Court.
The Tenth Circuit opinion embraced the Bosch rationale, adopting
the Court's conclusion that:
It follows here then, that when the application of a federal statute is involved, the decision of a state trial court as to an underlying issue of state law should a fortiori not be controlling
...
. If there be no decision by [the highest state court] then
federal authorities must apply what they find to be the state law after
giving "proper regard" to relevant rulings of other courts of the
72
State.
The problem with the Tenth Circuit's adoption and application of
the proper regard standard is its use outside the arena where it
originated. The proper regard standard is derived from a report of the
Senate Finance Committee recommending enactment of the marital deduction. 7 3 Bosch stated that "proper regard," not finality, "should be
given to interpretations of the will," by the state courts.74 By applying
this standard in Selby, the Tenth Circuit opened the door to federal court
review of all state trial court proceedings that might jeopardize the federal fisc. The decision failed to recognize the specific federal interests
involved in Congress' allowance of the marital deduction under section
2056(a). 7 5 Such specific congressional legislation was used as the vehicle for applying the proper regard only to decisions of the highest state
court. Thus, specific congressional action enabled the federal court to
examine the lower state court determination on state property law. The
Tenth Circuit failed to recognize that the Bosch Court's reliance on the
proper regard standard was necessary to construe the marital deduction
strictly, as Congress intended. 76 Selby lacked such a specific federal instate court and thus viewed as the "law of the state" as envisioned by Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
70. 726 F.2d at 646. Although the court characterized the probate court's determination as impacting the marital deduction, the impact is dubious. Selby merely ascertained
when, under Colorado law, assets are "accepted" by an estate. YetJudge Barrett's characterization enables him to adopt the standards of Bosch which were derived from the legislative history underlying enactment of the marital deduction.

71. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
72.

726 F.2d at 646 (emphasis in original) (quoting Bosch, 387 U.S. at 465).
REP. No. 1013, Pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 4 (1948).
74. Bosch, 387 U.S. at 464.
75. Id.
76. Id. Outside the arenas of the marital deduction and the administration of estates,
commentators have persuasively argued that the stricter examination of state court decisions prescribed by Bosch needs to be distinguished when assessing deductibility of administrative expenses under 26 U.S.C. § 2053 (1982). Pursuant to section 2053(a)(2),
administration expenses are deductible if they are "allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction . . . under which the estate is being administered." 26 U.S.C. § 2053(a)(2) (1982).

73. S.
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terest as estate administration is purely a function of state probate law.
Unlike the federal interest underlying the marital deduction in Bosch, the
administration in Selby involved no specific federal interest. In the absence of such specific federal interest, federal-state comity necessitates
greater federal deference to state court decisions which construe and
apply state property laws.
The Tenth Circuit opinion, moreover, failed to acknowledge the
criticism leveled at the Bosch decision by focusing upon its parity with the
supporting doctrine of Erie Railroad.7 7 Erie is based largely on the proposition that only the highest state court can make a final determination
of the state's common-law principles. 78 By contrast, any final state court
decision, in the absence of fraud or collusion, settles the property interests at issue in the case even if it has done so in a way later found to be at
variance with the law of the state. 79 In other words, Bosch failed to recognize that the Erie doctrine considers the controlling effect of local law,
not local adjudication. 8"
In Selby, Judge Barrett reviewed Colorado law, finding that the asThus, in the arena of an estate's administrative expenses, despite the specific federal interest in providing a deduction for these expenses, Congress chose to defer to state court
determination. The critics cite the pronouncement in Bosch that:
We cannot say that the authors [of Section 2056(a)] intended that the decrees of
state trial courts were to be conclusive and binding on the computation of the
federal estate tax as levied by the Congress. If the Congress had intended state trial
court determinations to have that effect on thefederalactions, it certainly would have said so-which it did not do.
387 U.S. at 646 (emphasis added). See, e.g., Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d
479, 484 n. I (2d Cir.) (Mulligan, J., dissenting) (observing that in Bosch, there "was no act
of Congress. . . citing jurisdiction to the state [courts)"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975);
Comment, Estate of Smith-Deductibility of Administration Expenses Under the Internal Revenue
Code and Under the Treasury Regulations: Resolving the Conflict, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 363,
377 (1975) (Bosch should not apply to section 2053(a) because the section "itself specifically makes its operation dependent upon state law.") Note, Current Problems Facing the
Executor Taking The Section 2053 Estate Tax Deduction, 30 VAND. L. REV. 795, 803, 804 (1977)
("[R]eliance [on Bosch] is misplaced . . . [tihe Court in Bosch was considering the marital
deduction under section 2056. In contrast, section 2053(a) does proclaim that state court
determinations are conclusive ..
") (emphasis in original); R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD
AND S. LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXATION
5.03(1), at 5-6 (5th ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as R. STEPHENS] (all of the items listed in section 2053(a) pass final muster as
estate tax deductions only if they are "allowable" under applicable local law. There is no
federal law that purports to say whether they are allowable in the obvious sense of the
requirement. The question is whether state law permits the amount to be paid by the
executor out of estate assets. This is a classic example of express reference to local law for
a principle to be applied in the implementation of a federal statute.) (emphasis in original).
77. See, e.g., R. STEPHENS, supra note 76, 4.05(2)(b), at 4-93. Under Bosch, the Erie
doctrine is stretched to permit Federal reexamination of a state decision which has settled
the property rights as between the litigating parties.
78. Id. at 4-93 n. 11.
79. See, e.g., Brown and Hinckle, Tax Effects of Non-Tax Litigation-Boschand Beyond, 27
N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1415, 1421-23 (1969); Note, Taxation: The Role of State Trial
Decisions in Federal Tax Litigation, 21 OKLA. L. REV. 227, 229-30 (1968); Note, Bosch and the
Binding Effect of State Court Adjudication Upon Subsequent Federal Tax Litigation, 21 VAND. L.
REV. 825, 840-41 (1968); Note, Binding Effect of State CourtJudgment in Federal Tax Cases, 21
Sw. L.J. 540, 544-45 (1967).
80. R. STEPHENS, supra note 76,
5.03(1) at 5-6, n. 14; see also Estate of Carson v.
Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. 1434 (1974). Thus local adjudication of property interests
should be given effect.
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sets were properly accepted by the estate. He concluded there was no
erroneous distribution of property to the estate. Judge Barrett found no
Colorado authority that would allow reopening a closed estate merely to
reduce the amount of federal estate tax. He also found the probate
court action was neither irregularly made nor procured by fraud or mistake. 8 1 Later the opinion asserted that "[t]o countenance the reopening
of estates on this basis, or other such self-serving purposes, would diminish the finality intended by estate closing procedures and place new
burdens on those responsible for assessing and collecting federal estate
82
taxes."
Facilitation of the assessment and collection of federal taxes, however, was not among the concerns of the Colorado legislature in enacting its probate code. Assuming the probate court incorrectly applied
Colorado law, correction in the Colorado courts and not in the federal
courts is in keeping with the long-standing policy expressed in the Rules
84
of Decision Act 8 3 and envisioned by Erie.
B.

General Powers of Appointment

A taxpayer's power to invade the trust corpus generally will cause
the entire trust corpus to be included in the taxpayer's gross estate. 85 In
Estate of Sowell v. Commissioner,86 the Tenth Circuit addressed the question of whether the power to invade the trust corpus "in case of emergency or illness" precipitated inclusion of the entire trust corpus in the
taxpayer's estate.
The basic test for determining whether a power to invade a trust
rises to the status of a general power of appointment under section
2041(b) 87 is whether such a power is one that can be exercised by the
decedent for his or her own benefit. 88 In Sowell, Judge Doyle measured
the power of appointment by first questioning whether the standard of
invasion was ascertainable 89 and, second, by questioning whether the
standard was related to, or reasonably measurable in terms of, the decedent's health, support or maintenance.9 0
The extent or terms of a decedent's ability to invade a trust depends
81. 726 F.2d at 648 (citing Williams v. Hankins, 82 Colo. 251, 258, 258 P. 1114, 1116
(1927)).
82. Selby, 726 F.2d at 648.
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982).
84. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Federal interests would still be protected in state court adjudications by command of the Supremacy Clause that "the laws of the United States ...
shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." U.S.
CONST., art. VI.
85. See 26 U.S.C. § 2041 (1982).
86. 708 F.2d 1564 (10th Cir. 1983).
87. 26 U.S.C. § 2041(b) (1982).
88. R. STEPHENS, supra note 76, 1 4.13(3) at 4-242.
89. 708 F.2d at 1566. The ascertainable standard requires that a standard be capable
of being interpreted and applied by a court of law. See generally Randall and Schmidt, The
Comforts of the Ascertainable Standard Exception, 59 TAXES 242 (1981).
90. See R. STEPHENS, supra note 76, 4.13(4)(a), 4-243.
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on state statutes and case law. 9 1 Judge Doyle examined state law for
guidelines in measuring whether the trust provision would be capable of
interpretation and application in a court of law, and found that the stan92
dard of invasion was ascertainable.
Once the powers the decedent enjoyed under state law have been
ascertained, the question of whether such powers constitute a general
93
power of appointment for estate tax purposes is a federal question.
The Internal Revenue Code provides that a power will not be treated as
a general power of appointment if the invasion power 94is related to the
decedent's health, education, support or maintenance.
Judge Doyle scrutinized the trust's appointment clause as it related
to the decedent's health, education and support. He found the tax court
erred in its underlying assumption that the word "emergency" was in95
He
herently broader in meaning than health, education and support.
recognized that the fundamental circumstance of an emergency is need
and that the power to invade the trust only in emergency situations denied the decedent unfettered command of the trust corpus. Satisfied
that the purposes of section 2041 were not being thwarted, Judge Doyle
held that, since such invasion would be tolerated only in times of need,
this power was sufficiently related to invasions on the basis of health,
education and support. 9 6
III.

SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAX: THE BELATED BELIEF CASE

97
Congress
As part of the Social Security Amendments of 1967,
changed the framework for the exemption of ministers from self-employment taxes. Prior to 1967, ordained ministers were automatically
98
Since the adoption of the
excluded from Social Security coverage.
amendments, ministers may still be exempt provided they meet the stat99
utory requirements of Internal Revenue Code section 1402(e).

Section 1402(e)(l) allows an exemption from self-employment
taxes for compensation earned from services performed as a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church. The duly ordained minister must file an application together with a statement that
he or she is conscientiously or religiously opposed to the acceptance of
91. Id. at 4-243.
92. 708 F.2d at 1567. "Certainly the New Mexico court could readily ascertain the
meaning of the governing words here." Cf. Rev. Rul. 76-502, 1976-2 C.B. 273.
93. R. STEPHENS, supra note 76, 4.13(3) at 4-243. Local characterization of the inva-

sion power is not controlling. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, as amended in denial of
rehg, 309 U.S. 626 (1940).
94. 26 U.S.C. § 2041(b)(1)(A) (1982).
95. 708 F.2d at 1566.
96. See 26 U.S.C. § 2041(b)(1)(B). In deliniating the abilities of the decedent to invade the trust, Judge Doyle concluded "the term 'emergency' is a limiting word and would
not tolerate any excuse. Accordingly, mental depression requiring a trip around the world
would not be a proper occasion for invading the trust." Id. at 1567.
97. Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821 (1967) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.).
98. Ballinger v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 752, 756 n.2 (1982).
99. 26 U.S.C. § 1402(e) (1982).
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public insurance.1 00 Section 1402(e)(2) provides that the minister must
file the application not later than the due date of the tax return for the
second taxable year for which he or she has net earnings of $400 or
more, any part of which is derived from the performance of services as a
duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church in the
exercise of his or her ministry.' 0 1
In Ballinger v. Commissioner,10 2 a minister was issued a certificate of
ordination by the First Missionary Baptist Church of St. Louis, Missouri
in 1969. While pursuing his duties as a minister of this church he did not
oppose the acceptance of public insurance and never sought exemption
from self-employment taxes. In September, 1973, he became an
unordained minister of the Maranatha Church in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma. As a result of "evolving beliefs"' 1 3 he became opposed to
the acceptance of public insurance. On May 2, 1978, he was formally
issued a certificate of ordination by the Maranatha Church and in July of
1978, filed an application for exemption. After an initial approval, the
IRS revoked his exemption.
In an opinion by Judge McKay, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the IRS
revocation. Judge McKay found no statutory exemption for a minister
who belatedly acquires a belief which opposes public insurance.' 0 4 The
court found that Ballinger's informal assumption of ministerial duties
satisfied the statutory requirement that the individual seeking the exemption be a duly ordained, commissioned or licensed minister. Judge
McKay found the two-year statutory time period was triggered by the
assumption of ministerial duties and functions. Thus, Ballinger's subsequent ordination was irrelevant as the two-year period had already
lapsed. ' 0 5
By this construction the court rewrote the statute. Section
1402(e)(1) establishes the exemption and Section 1402(e)(2) sets forth
the time for filing the exemption application. But the court's analysis
combines the two subsections, leaving a messy melange which fails to
implement fully the directives of each subsection.
Section 1402(e)(1) provides an exemption for individuals duly ordained, commissioned or licensed as a minister of a church. Ballinger,
however, indicates that a formal ordination is not required. Merely as1
suming ministerial duties satisfies the congressional prescription. 06
100. Id. § 1402(e)(1).
101. Id. § 1402(e)(2).
102. 728 F.2d 1287 (10th Cir. 1984).
103. Id. at 1289; 78 T.C. at 755.
104. 728 F.2d at 1290.
105. Id.
106. The court's adoption of its quasi-ordination test violates a basic maxim of statutory construction that "in construing a statute, the court is obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used." Reiter v. Sontone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979).
See also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 739-40 (1978) ("Normally, a statute must if
reasonably possible, be construed in a way that will give force and effect to each of its
provisions rather than render some of them meaningless."); Allen Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 336, 339 (2d Cir. 1980); FTC v. Manager, Retail Credit Co., 515 F.2d
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Hence, Ballinger had two years from the informal assumption of duties
at the second church to file for the exemption. Section 1402(e)(1) also
requires the applicant to include a statement that he or she is either
conscientiously or religiously opposed to the acceptance of public insurance. Ballinger did not acquire his religiously based opposition to public insurance until 1977,107 four years after he assumed the functions of
a minister at his new church. Under the court's interpretation, Ballinger
could never qualify for the section 1402 exemption because he lacked a
condition precedent for exemption (opposition, conscientiously or religiously based) which he did not develop until after the statutory period
had lapsed.
As a result of the court's decision, "evolving beliefs" resulting in
opposition to public insurance will be given effect only if the change
occurs within a two-year period after the assumption of ministerial duties, regardless of when formal ordination occurs. 10 8
IV.

RAILROAD PROPERTY TAx

In 1976 Congress, in an attempt to restore the economic well-being
of the nation's railroads, passed the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976.109 One of the goals of this Act was "to eliminate the long-standing burden on interstate commerce resulting from
discriminatory state and local taxation of common and contract carrier
transportation property."" 0 Section 306 of the Act prohibits both de
facto and dejure discrimination in the assessment, levying and collection
of taxes on rail property." 'I During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit
heard two cases which presented difficult questions concerning burdens
of proof, the proper role of the federal courts, and the prima facie showing necessary in suits brought under the anti-discriminatory provisions
of section 306.
Under section 306(2)(c) a railroad can obtain relief when the assessment ratio for railroad property exceeds by five percent the assessment
ratio of commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction.' 12 Pursuant to Kansas law, property subject to tax is assessed
988, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Blasius, 397 F.2d 203, 207 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
granted 393 U.S. 950, cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 1008 (1969).
107. 728 F.2d at 1289.
108. Spiritual growth and change. however, will be griven effect upon assumption of
duties and functions at a new church.
109. Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31, 54 (section 306 of the Act was first codified at 49
U.S.C. § 26c (1982)). Later the language of section 306 was changed and the section was
recodified as part of the Revised Interstate Commerce Act of 1978 (also known as the 4R
Act), Pub. L. No. 95-473, 92 Stat. 1337 (1978) placing section 306 at 49 U.S.C. § 11503
(1982).
110. S. REP. No. 630, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1969). Congress used the commerce
clause to effectuate the policy. Congress found that discriminatory taxing of rail property
"constitute[s] an unreasonable and unjust discrimination against, and an undue burden on
interstate commerce." See Clinchfield R.R. v. Lynch, 527 F. Supp. 784, 785 (E.D.N.C.
1981), ajtd on other grounds, 700 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1983).

11I. See Clinchfield, 527 F. Supp. at 785.
112. 732 F.2d at 1500.
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at thirty percent of its fair market value.' 13 In Atchison, Topeka, and Santa
Fe Railway v. Lennen, 114 the Tenth Circuit determined whether sufficient
evidence had been presented by the railroad to prove the assessment
ratio for commercial and industrial property in the Kansas
jurisdiction. 115

The railroads computed the assessed value of their rail property by
taking thirty percent of its true market value as determined by the Kansas director of property valuation. 1 6 Similarly, the railroads introduced
the Kansas Real Estate Assessment/Sales Ratio for 1980 to prove the
ratio of the assessed value to the true market value for commercial and
industrial properties. Apparently, the railroads took cognizance of subsection 306(2)(e) of the Act which tacitly expresses a preference for establishing this assessment ratio by means of a sales assessment ratio
study."i 7 The Tenth Circuit, per Judge Logan, found that the district
court erroneously permitted the railroads to prove the assessment ratio
for commercial and industrial property by means of a sales assessment
study based upon real estate only."i 8 The court noted the Act's explicit
reference to personal property in its definition of commercial and industrial property on which the sales assessment ratio study would be
based." 9 The railroads offered no evidence as to the assessment ratio
of personal property. Despite the railroad's contention that such could
not be performed, Judge Logan held that the statute mandated at least a
20
showing that such a study would be prohibitively expensive.'
In Burlington Northern Railroad v. Lennen, 12 1 the court, again per
Judge Logan, defined the proper role of federal courts in section 306
actions and delineated the showing of overvaluation which is necessary
to maintain a suit under section 306. In Burlington, various railroads
sought an injunction against the Kansas taxing authorities to prohibit
them from applying discriminatory assessments. The railroads alleged a
form of defacto discrimination whereby the state authorities taxed both
113.

KAN. STAT. ANN.

§ 79-1439 (1977), amended by

KAN. STAT. ANN.

§ 79-1439 (Cum.

Supp. 1983 Vol. 6A).
114. 732 F.2d 1495 (10th Cir. 1984).
115. Id. at 1501.
116. Id. at 1499.
117. Subsection 306(2)(e) provides in part: "[Iln the event that the ratio of the as-

sessed value of all other commercial and industrial property in the assessment jurisdiction
to the true market value of all such other commercial and industrial property cannot be
established through the random sampling method known as a sales assessment ratio study
...to the satisfaction of the court .
118. 732 F.2d at 1503.
119. Id. at 1501.
120. Id. at 1504. Upon a showing that a sales assessment ratio study for personal property would be prohibitively expensive,Judge Logan indicated that proof by appraisal studies or expert testimony may be permitted. Id.
121. 715 F.2d 494 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2690 (1984). Burlington
Northern was cited in Atchinson for the proposition that, in the absence of a strong showing
of purposeful overvaluation with discriminatory intent, Congress did not intend for fed-

eral courts to become involved in the challenges of a state official's determination of true
market value. Atchinson, 732 F.2d at 1500 n.5.
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rail and commercial property at the same rate but assessed the rail property at a value higher than its true market value.
Judge Logan determined that section 306 was not intended to protect rail carriers from every form of defacto discrimination. In particular,
he found the discrimination alleged, termed valuation discrimination, to
be outside the range of reprehensible discrimination which the federal
courts have the power to remedy.12 2 Additionally, in recognition of the
coercive burdens federal courts place on the states by enjoining their tax
collection process, Judge Logan placed a higher burden on railroads
seeking relief under section 306. A prima facie case therefore will be
recognized only when the plaintiff makes a strong showing of purposeful
12 3
overvaluation of rail property with discriminatory intent.
These cases serve to remove the Tenth Circuit from the orbit of
other circuit and district courts which have considered section 306 discrimination suits. By requiring the assessment ratio study to be derived
from both real and personal property, Atchison diametrically opposes the
Fourth Circuit's Clinchfield Railroad124 rationale. The district court in
Clinchfield construed section 306(2)(e) as firmly establishing that a properly conducted sales assessment ratio study serves as a benchmark for
assessing discrimination and federal relief, provided the study is accepted as satisfactory proof by the adjudicating court. 125 Furthermore,
Atchison rejects legislative history showing that Congress understood
sales assessment ratio surveys to be studies of real property. 126 Instead,
Judge Logan endorsed the statements of an expert who testified before a
Senate subcommittee that sales assessment ratio surveys could be undertaken for certain kinds of personal property. 127 It was this testimony
that enabled judge Logan to find, in the face of evidence to the contrary,
that Congress intended a sales assessment ratio study for both real and
28

personal property. 1

122. 715 F.2d at 497. A form of defacto discrimination which has been recognized as
falling within the anti-discriminatory net is the imposition of the same rate of tax on both
classes of property, but applying that rate to a property value below the true market value
of commercial property while applying the rate to the true market value of rail property.
Defacto discrimination should be distinguished from dejure discrimination. Dejure is
found when taxing authorities impose a higher percentage rate on rail than on commercial
property. See id.
123. Id. at 498.
124. Clinchfield R.R. v. Lynch, 700 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1983).
125. Clinchfield R.R. v. Lynch, 527 F. Supp. 784, 787 (E.D.N.C. 1981), afd on other
grounds, 700 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1983). (The Fourth Circuit did not approve of strict reliance on sales assessment ratio studies of real estate alone, opining that personal property
should be considered. The Fourth Circuit fell far short of endorsing sales assessment ratio
studies for personal property).
126. 732 F.2d at 1502.
127. Id. See State Tax Discrimination Against Interstate CarrierProperty: Hearing on S. 2289
Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transportationof the Senate Committee on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 63 (1969) (Statement of Rolf Weil, President, Roosevelt Univ.).
128. See National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. CAB, 618 F.2d 819, 828
(D.C. Cir. 1980):
Courts in the past have been able to rely on legislative history for important insights into congressional intent. Without implying that this is no longer the case,
we note that interest groups who fail to persuade a majorily ofCongress to accept
particular statutory language often are able to have inseried, in the legislative
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It is the Burlington Northern opinion that places the Tenth Circuit far
outside the purview of mainstream 306 construction. The Eighth Circuit, in Ogilvie v. State Board of Equalization,12 9 stated that the purpose of
section 306 is to prevent tax discrimination against railroads "in any
form whatsoever."' 130 Yet, in Burlington Northern, the Tenth Circuit bifurcated de facto discrimination into protected and unprotected
classes.' 3 ' By recognizing that the statute fails to prescribe a proper
method for valuing rail property, the Tenth Circuit excuses the discriminatory tactics of overvaluating rail property as unprotected.
Burlington Northern is anomalous in another facet. Despite the express exception in section 306(2) to the Tax Injunction Act, 132 Judge
Logan found that Congress never intended for the courts to sidestep the
general noninterference rule of the Tax Injunction Act. 133 This view is
directly opposite the Eleventh Circuit's perception of the availability of a
federal forum for section 306 discrimination suits. In Southern Railway v.
State Board of Equalization,134 the Eleventh Circuit recognized a section
306 exception "not only to the Tax Injunction Act, but also to the underlying doctrine of equitable restraint in the narrow area of discriminatory taxation of railroads."' 1 3 5
Viewing Congress as acting
unconditionally to ensure federal forums, the Eleventh Circuit found
section 306 to go beyond exemption from the Tax Injunction Act and all
its forms and prohibit "Burford abstention" 136 in cases of either dejure or
defacto discrimination against railroads.137 The Eleventh Circuit's position was buttressed by the Supreme Court's mandate in Patsy v. Board of
history of the statute, statements favorable to their position, in the hope that they
can persuade a court to construe the statutory language in light of these statements. This development underscores the importance of following unambiguous
statutory language absent clear contrary evidence of legislative intent.
129. 657 F.2d 204 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1086 (1981).
130. Id. at 210.
131. 715 F.2d at 497.
132. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). The Tax Injunction Act provides that: "[T]he district
courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax
under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of
such State."
133. 715 F.2d at 498.
134. 715 F.2d 522 (1lth Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1593 (1984).
135. Id. at 529.
136. As recognized by the Southern Ry. court, Burford abstention is generally invoked
where the "exercise of federal review of the [state law] question in a case or similar cases
would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter
of substantial public concern." Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (from which Burford
abstention derives its name); see also BT Inv. Managers, Inc. v. Lewis, 559 F.2d 950, 954-55
(5th Cir. 1977).
Burford abstention is separate from two other forms of abstention. Pullman abstention
may be appropriate in order to avoid unnecessary friction in federal-state relations by abstaining on federal constitutional questions which "depend upon, or may be altered by,
the determination of an uncertain issue of state law." Southern Ry., 715 F.2d at 527 n. 10
(quoting Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965) (citing Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 213 U.S. 496 (1942)). In Younger abstention, the federal courts withhold their
intervention in state criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971).
137. 715 F.2d at 527.
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Regents' s 8 that "[a] court should not defer the exercise of its jurisdiction
under a Federal'statute unless it is consistent with [the statute's] intent." 13 9 Federal courts, therefore, should be required to evaluate
whether a state has assessed rail property at a value higher than its true
value. In the Tenth Circuit, however, a federal forum is not available for
railroads alleging that a state has discriminated against it by overassessing the fair value of its rail property.
Finally, both Atchison and Burlington Northern are inconsistent as to
section 306 construction. Atchison stated that a railroad "may easily determine the true market value of its railroad property."' 40 Burlington
Northern found "complex problems associated with the valuation of rail
property."' 4 ' This alleged complexity lead the Burlington Northern court
to find certain state discriminatory tactics unreviewable. The two cases
are also unreconcilable when assessing the burden of proof necessary to
make a prima facie showing under section 306. Atchison adopted the section 306(2)(c) provision which provides relief when the assessment ratio
for railroad property exceeds the assessment ratio for other commercial
and industrial property by five percent.14 2 Conversely, under Burlington
Northern, a prima facie case exists whenever a railroad can make a strong
showing of a purposeful overvaluation of a particular railroad's property
143
with discriminatory intent.
James R. Walker

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

457 U.S. 496 (1982).
Id. at 501-02.
732 F.2d at 1500.
715 F.2d at 497.
732 F.2d at 1500.
715 F.2d at 498.

